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1. Introduction
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(1987) is considered to be one of the most successful and important
pieces of international environmental legislation in history. This treaty
and successive agreements place binding limits on the production and
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consumption of the main ozone depleting chemicals, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, hydrofluorocarbons and methyl bromide.1 These chemicals have been widely
used as refrigerants, coolants, aerosol propellants and industrial solvents. All of these compounds are extremely stable, nonflammable,
non-toxic, non-corrosive and cheap to produce (Benedick, 1991). However, their use has resulted in a thinning of stratospheric ozone around
the globe. The resulting increase in the intensity of UV-rays reaching the surface of the earth may augment skin cancer rates among
humans, decrease plankton production in the oceans, and negatively
affect agricultural production.
The Montreal Protocol and the pursuit of other international environmental agreements affecting the environment has generated an
extensive theoretical literature that examines strategic behavior in the
formation of an international environmental agreement (e.g. Barrett
(1990), Carraro & Siniscalco (1993), Hoel & Schneider (1997))2 . Fewer
papers have suggested that the expectation of a forthcoming agreement
may lead actors (governments or sources of pollution) to alter their
behavior.3 One reason this may occur is that environmental agreements
often specify cutbacks in the production of harmful substances relative
to a negotiated baseline level of production.4 If producers anticipate
the future adoption of an agreement, forcing them to reduce their
production by a certain amount below some baseline, they may have
an incentive to increase production before the agreement is struck to
influence the choice of baseline adopted in the agreement.
In this paper we examine changes in the strategic behavior of CFC
producers prior to the adoption of the Montreal Protocol in 1987.
Because of severe limitations on the availability of CFC production
data, we are forced to conduct a highly aggregative empirical analysis

1
Chlorofluorocarbons are also one of the largest contributors to the greenhouse
effect.
2
The empirical literature on international environmental agreements is rather
scant. Murdoch & Sandler (1997a) and Murdoch & Sandler (1997b) have examined
the reductions of CFCs and sulfur dioxide before the reductions mandated by their
respective international agreements went into effect. Congleton (1992) examined
the impact of political institutional arrangements on international environmental
regulation. No paper has addressed the issue of anticipatory behavior prior to an
international environmental agreement that is the subject of this paper.
3
See Copeland (1990); Buchholz & Konrad (1994), and Stranlund (1999). This
literature is entirely theoretical; no attempt has been made to look for empirical
evidence of changes in behavior prior to an international environmental agreement.
4
The Kyoto Protocol, for example, states cutbacks in terms of 1990 CO2
equivalent emission levels.
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of the strategic behavior of United States producers of CFCs and the
behavior of producers in the rest of world for which data are available.
This paper does not attempt to provide formal tests of the specific
hypotheses about anticipatory strategic behavior offered in the theoretical literature. Rather, the purpose is to examine the implications for
such an agreement and consider methods for empirical measurement of
these effects in the years immediately preceding the Montreal Protocol.
The next section briefly discusses the history of CFCs and provides
an account of the negotiations leading up to the Montreal Protocol.
This section serves as the motivation for the model specification given
in section 3. Section 4 provides estimation results and a discussion as
to their implications. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks and
suggestions for future research.

2. Background
Chlorofluorocarbons were invented in 1928. They made possible the
mass proliferation of air conditioning and refrigeration (Cagin & Dray,
1993). The pattern of global and United States production of CFCs
is shown in Figure 1.5 Production of the rest of the world is obtained
by subtracting US production from global production figures. World
production of CFCs rose from 544 metric tons in 1934 to 812,522 metric
tons in 1974 (Alternative Fluorocarbons Environmental Acceptability
Study, 1997). This is equivalent to an average annual rate of 23.51%
between 1934 and 1974.
In 1974 Molina and Rowland published their research on the breakdown of CFCs in the earth’s stratosphere and the resulting destruction
of ozone molecules. The US, followed by Canada, Norway and Sweden,
banned the use of nonessential aerosols in March of 1978. A number of
international scientific conferences that addressed the possible consequences of ozone depletion were held in years following. In addition the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) pushed to have an
international convention with the goal of negotiating a binding agreement. During these years, from 1974 until the end of 1982, there was
a reversal in the global production trend. Global production of CFCs
declined on average by 3.54% per year. During this time the ban of
CFCs in nonessential uses by the US, Canada, Sweden and Norway
was followed by a commitment of the European Community in 1980 to
implement a capacity cap and reduce aerosol use by thirty percent.
5

We limit our analysis to CFC-11 and CFC-12, which are the two main sources
of ozone depletion prior to the Montreal Protocol
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Figure 1. Production of CFC-11 and CFC-12 in the USA and the rest of the world

An ad hoc working group, convened by UNEP, began to negotiate
a convention on research, monitoring, and data exchange in 1982, but
failed to agree on a protocol for controlling CFCs by 1985. During this
time, however, increased public and political pressure made it apparent that international diplomatic efforts to negotiate the regulation of
CFC production was imminent. In March 1985 43 nations convened in
Vienna to complete work on the first international ozone convention,
later titled the Vienna Convention. This non-binding agreement bound
nations to ’take appropriate measures’ to protect the ozone layer. More
importantly, all 43 signatory nations agreed to renegotiate for a binding
agreement in 1987.
The negotiations leading up to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer were marked by the willingness of both
the United States’ and some European governments to reach a binding
agreement on the regulation of CFC production. There was, however,
great resistance by industry groups on both sides of the Atlantic until late in 1986. The major producers did not ”find enough scientific
evidence” warranting restrictions on the production of ozone depleting substances. Richard Benedick, the chief negotiator for the United
States notes that about three months prior to the scheduled start of
negotiations a coalition of about 500 U.S. producer and user companies
changed their position and supported the international regulation of
CFCs’ (Benedick, 1991). Mostafa Tolba, the head of UNEP, notes that
as a result of this, the US changed its position and supported a global
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freeze on CFC production followed by a series of reductions that would
lead to a complete ban (Tolba, 1998). He further argues that European
chemical industries saw US industries as being a step ahead of them in
developing substitutes for CFCs, which could endanger their markets
(Tolba, 1998). Overall, the United States and EC disagreed over almost
every issue at every step along the route to Montreal (Benedick, 1991).
The 60 governments participating in the Montreal negotiations agreed
to a binding protocol in 1987. Reductions in the production of CFCs
were stated in terms of individual countries’ 1986 levels of production
(United Nations Environment Programme, 2000). These reductions
were revised and tightened in later amendments to the protocol.
Shortly after the adoption of the Montreal Protocol, empirical evidence linking CFCs to the destruction of ozone was found. The search
for alternative compounds was successful and a trade fair on CFC substitutes was held in Washington D.C. in January of 1988. Two months
later Du Pont, one of the main producers of CFCs, announced the phase
out of the production of CFCs.
Figure 1 shows a structural break in production during 1982. The
previously stagnant or downward trend now reverted to an upward
trend, resembling production patterns prior to the discovery of the
harmful effects caused by CFCs. From 1983 to 1987, global production
of CFCs grew by an annual average of 6.15%. This change in trend
of production is curious, but alone it does not suggest anticipatory
production behavior on the part of the United States and the rest of
the world. However, the trend reversal does suggest that an empirical
investigation into the possibility of anticipatory behavior is likely to
yield interesting results.
3. Model Development
The theoretical model underlying the empirical analysis of this paper
is assumed to be a Nash-Cournot model in which each nation/player
chooses its production of CFCs in a particular time period based in part
on what it believes will be aggregate production of CFCs in the rest
of the world.6 Each country’s belief about CFC production in the rest
of the world is confirmed in every time period so that the distribution
of production levels across countries forms a Nash equilibrium in every
time period.
Country-specific data on CFC production are not available. Aggregate global production figures from 1931 - 1995 were compiled via a
6

In both the theoretical and empirical literature on international environmental
agreements, it is common to assume that decisions are made at the national level.
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confidential reporting mechanism by the Alternative Fluorocarbons
Environmental Acceptability Study (AFEAS). This dataset includes
aggregate production figures for producers from the U.S., Italy, France,
Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Belgium and Japan and their subsidiaries (AFEAS, 1995).7 The United States Tariff Commission reports
production for the United States from 1958 until the present. Because country-specific production figures are not available for countries
other than the United States8 , we are led to consider a two-player
Nash-Cournot game between the United States and the rest of the
world.
Let U usa be welfare for the United States and let U row be welfare
for the rest of the world in some time period. Similarly, let CF C usa be
total U.S. production in a particular time period, and let CF C row be
the corresponding production for the rest of the world. Then, a pair
[CF C usa , CF C row ] is a Nash equilibrium in a particular time period
if the production levels solve (1) and (2) simultaneously:
max

U usa = U (CF C usa , CF C row , Dusa , P usa , P olicy)

(1)

max

U row = U (CF C row , CF C usa , Drow , P row , P olicy)

(2)

CF C usa
CF C row

Non-production exogenous variables that enter the welfare functions
consist of demand, cost and policy variables for each player, as well as
the opponent’s production for the same time period. Dusa and Drow
proxy for CFC demand side effects. P row and P usa indicate the cost of
production for each player. Policy consists of slope dummies for time
periods that could possibly affect pre-treaty behavior of each player.
Assuming for each i ² (usa, row) U i is strictly concave in CF C i ,
the standard first-order conditions associated with the simultaneous
maximization of (1) and (2) implicitly define the Nash best-response
functions:
CF C usa = f (CF C row , Dusa , P usa , P olicy)
CF C row = f (CF C usa , Drow , P row , P olicy)

(3)
(4)

These Nash best response functions indicate how each player’s optimal choice of production of CFCs changes due to a change in any
of the exogenous variables on the right hand side. It is important to
note that each player’s optimal level of production depends on the
7

The countries, which contained at least one subsidiary of said producers produced approximately one sixth of the amount produced in the eight main countries
listed and accounted for less than 15% of global production in 1986.
8
Country level production data is available after 1986 in United Nations
Environmental Programme Ozone Secretariat (2002)
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opponent’s choice of production for that same time period. The nature
of this dependence and how it changes over time is the primary focus
of this paper.
Of particular importance to this analysis is what Bulow, Geanakoplos & Klemperer (1985) call ”aggressiveness”. To illustrate this concept,
suppose the US producers of CFCs believe that producers in the rest of
the world will increase their production of CFCs. Bulow et al. (1985)
would call the behavior of US producers aggressive if they respond
to this new belief with a significant increase in their own production;
they would be called less aggressive if they respond with a smaller
increase or decrease in production. Note the simple fact that the slope
of their best response function captures the relative aggressiveness of
US producers - a strong positive slope indicates relatively aggressive
behavior, while a weaker, or negative, slope indicates less aggressive
behavior. Of course, all this applies to producers in the rest of the
world as well. An important focus of this paper is whether producers
of CFCs became more or less aggressive in the years preceding the
Montreal Protocol.
The high level of aggregation in this paper raises the question whether
the second player (ROW) can act act strategically, since it is a group of
countries. Benedick’s (1991) account suggests that the producers in the
European Union, contained in the AFEAS (1995) dataset, had adopted
a joint strategy in the negotiations. Japan which was responsible for
roughly 10% of global production in 1986 adopted its own negotiating
strategy, which followed the lead of the EU (Benedick, 1991). This
take this as evidence in support of the belief that the ROW player
conducted coordinated behavior in the negotiations leading up to the
Montreal Protocol. In all interpretations it should therefore be noted
that the rest of the world here essentially contains producers from the
European Union and Japan.
In accordance with the theoretical model, the matrix of explanatory variables should include exogenous variables that capture the cost
and demand effects on the production of chlorofluorocarbons for each
player, the opponent’s production figures, as well as a vector of dummy
variables capturing the changes in policy prior to the Montreal Protocol. The economic model used for later estimation is given in equations
(5) and (6):
CF Ctusa = f (CF C row , CF C row2 , CF C row3 , OILt , GDPtusa )
CF Ctrow = f (CF C usa , CF C usa2 , CF C usa3 , OILt , GDPtrow )

(5)
(6)

The left hand side variable for each model (CF Ctusa and CF Ctrow )
consists of the combined production of CFC-11 and CFC-12. As outlined in the theoretical specification of the model in equations (3) and
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(4), the United States react to demand variables unique to the United
States. The rest of the world reacts to a set of variables, which capture
effects unique to the producers outside of the United States. A summary
description of the variables and their meaning is given in table I. As a
Table I. Names and Description of Variables used in Estimation
Variable Name

Description

CF C usa
CF C row
CF C usa2
CF C usa3
CF C row2
CF C row3
GDP usa
GDP row
OIL

US CFC production in metric tons
Rest of the world CFC production in metric tons
US Slope Dummy 1975-82
US Slope Dummy 1983-87
ROW Slope Dummy 1975-82
ROW Slope Dummy 1983-87
United States GDP (1995 constant US$)
GDP of ROW countries (1995 constant US$)
Spot market price for barrel of crude oil
(Constant 1995 US$)

proxy for demand variables we used Gross Domestic Product for the
United States and the aggregate purchasing power parity adjusted gross
domestic product for countries contained in the AFEAS (1997) sample.
This aggregate measure should be a reasonable proxy for the demand\
market size for CFCs in the industrialized countries. We tested all of
our series for non-stationarity using the test proposed by Kahn & Ogaki
(1992). We fail to reject the null of stationarity, but acknowledge the
fact that due to the limited length of the series, any test for stationarity
has limited power. We used the price of oil in terms of 1995 US$ as a
proxy for costs of production and capital. CFCs are a petroleum-based
product; therefore, the world market price of oil should be a good proxy
for the costs of inputs to production.
The history of production and consumption of CFCs, the discovery of their harmful effects on stratospheric ozone, and unilateral and
international efforts leading to the adoption of the Montreal Protocol
suggest three very distinct time periods before the Montreal Protocol
was signed in 1987. Summarizing our discussion the three distinct time
periods under study are therefore 1958 - 1974 (Period I ), 1975 - 1982
(Period II ) and 1983 - 1987 (Period III ). During Period I the hazardous
effects of chlorofluorocarbons on the environment were unknown. There
were no policies limiting the production of these substances in any country. Period II captures the years after the publication of the paper by
Molina & Rowland (1974), which were characterized by increased public
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attention, but no plans for an International Environmental Agreement.
Period III starts with the year negotiations toward placing binding
limits on CFC production and consumption began and ended with the
adoption of the Montreal Protocol in 1987.9
In order to capture any changes in production behavior during these
three time periods, the Policy variables included in the model consist of
two slope dummy variables. To catch the possible changes in the opponent’s production behavior during Period II, the slope shifter variable,
CF C row2 takes on the values of CF C row during Period II. Similarly,
the slope shifter variable for Period III, CF C row3 , takes on the values
of CF C row for the years in Period III. (CF C usa2 and CF C usa3 are
obtained the same way). We assume the best response functions (5)
and (6) and estimate:
CF Ctusa = β0 + β1 CF Ctrow + β2 CF Ctrow2 + β3 CF Ctrow3
+β4 OILt + β5 GDPtusa + εt
CF Ctrow = γ0 + γ1 CF Ctusa + γ2 CF Ctusa2 + γ3 CF Ctusa3
+γ4 OILt + γ5 GDPtrow + ηt

(7)
(8)

We fail to reject the null hypothesis of linearity in the right hand
side variables. In this two-player game, the US and the rest of the world
choose their production simultaneously and the opponent’s choice of
production enters the equation on the right hand side. The disturbance
terms are not independent from all of the variables on the right-hand
side in this model. We estimate equations (7) and (8) via the three
stage least squares (3SLS) estimator. Regressing the endogenous right
hand side variables on US and rest of the world energy usage and
intercept dummy variables for Periods I and II resulted in satisfactory
instrumental variables for use in the 3SLS estimation.

4. Results
Table II provides the estimation results and summary statistics. These
form the basis for interpreting how the production behavior of each
player changed with respect to the opponent’s behavior from Period I
to Period II and to Period III. The obtained values indicate a good fit
for the model. The Durbin-Watson statistics fall into the uncertainty
region. This may hint at misspecification issues, which we cannot rule
9
Since the date of the break from Period II to Period III is not quite as clear as
the first break we conduct a predictive Chow test and confirm that a statistically
significant break at the 1% level occurred in 1983.
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Table II. 3SLS Estimation Results
Variable

Reaction Function USA
Intercept
CF C row
CF C row2
CF C row3
GDP usa
OIL
Durbin Watson Statistic
df

180356b
0.84a
-0.23a
-0.26a
-31.58
-2425.71a

2.57
6.50
-5.34
-4.38
-1.13
-3.46

-186547a
1.06a
0.63a
0.72a
30.04c
-750.18

Durbin Watson Statistic
df

-7.09
4.15
4.47
2.90
1.90
-0.63

1.518
24

R2 (System weighted)
significant at 1%

t-statistic

1.301
24

Reaction Function ROW
Intercept
CF C usa
CF C usa2
CF C usa3
GDP row
OIL

a

Parameter
Estimate

0.9804
b

significant at 5%

c

significant at 10%

out due to the small sample size. The parameter estimates are, however,
not very susceptible to alternate specifications.
The main question to be addressed by this paper is if nations did
display anticipatory production behavior prior to the Montreal Protocol. In order to interpret the estimation results in a way that may
answer this question one needs to look at each player’s individual Nash
best response function, and see if there are any statistically significant
shifts from Period I to Period II and Period III.
The results presented in table II show that the production behavior of both players changed with respect to their opponent’s behavior
from Period I (1958 - 1974) to Period II (1975 - 1982) and to Period III (1983-1987). The parameter estimates for CF C row , CF C row2 ,
CF C row3 , CF C usa , CF C usa2 and CF C usa3 are all significant at the 1%
level. The parameter estimates for CF C row , CF C row3 , CF C usa2 and
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CF C usa3 , which are all jointly significant with CF C usa and CF C row
respectively, indicate changes in slope of the players’ best response
functions from Period I. A positive parameter estimate for any of these
variables indicates an increase in aggressiveness relative to Period I.
An increase in aggressiveness in this context means that a player will
respond to an increase in production by its opponent by producing relatively more output than it would have in the original period, assuming
a positively sloped best response function. Should the best response
function be negatively sloped, the player would react to such behavior
by decreasing its production by a relatively smaller amount than it
would have in the original time period.
During Period I the United States’ Nash best response function is
upward sloping in its opponent’s production. A one ton increase in
the production of chlorofluorocarbons by the rest of the world would
cause the United States to produce an additional 0.84 tons during the
years of 1958 to 1974. This behavior can be attributed to the mass
proliferation of these cheap and incredibly useful chemicals during this
time. Refrigerators as well as air conditioning units were being mass
marketed during this time and there was a tremendous global demand
for these substances.
The parameter estimate for CF C row2 indicates a decrease in slope
of the United States’ best response function for Period II (1975-1982).
As shown in table II, the slope decreases by 0.23. For these years after
the discovery of the harmful effects of chlorofluorocarbons, the United
States’ producers would respond to a one ton increase in production by
the rest of the world by increasing their own production by only 0.61
tons. Thus, they became less aggressive in Period II. This is probably
due to the ban of CFCs in non-essential uses by the United States. It
may also have been more costly to increase production of CFCs for
United States producers during this period because of increased public
pressure on the main producers.
Possible changes in slopes of the best response functions during
Period III (1983-1987) will show if nations did in fact change their
behavior in anticipation of the Montreal Protocol. The estimate for
CF C row3 is -0.26, which means that each additional ton of CFCs produced by the rest of the world would result in a 0.58 ton increase in
production by the United States. This result shows that the United
States, during the years of 1983 until 1987, displayed slightly less aggressive production behavior in comparison to Periods I and II. This less
aggressive production behavior could indicate some strategic behavior
on the part of US producers. Even though Benedick (1991) argues that
Du Pont had not yet developed substitutes for CFCs, they had previously invested significant resources into the development of substitutes.
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US producers may have therefore had an edge on rest of the world
producers in the development of substitutes.
The rest of the world’s production behavior can be interpreted in
the same fashion. Table II reveals that during the years from 1958
until 1974, the rest of the world’s reaction function was positively
sloped. The estimate of CF C usa indicates that for a one ton increase
in US chlorofluorocarbon production, the rest of the world increased
its production by 1.06 tons. Both players had an upward sloping best
response function during Period I. The estimated slope for each player’s
best response function during these years, 0.84 for the United States
and 1.06 for the rest of the world, shows that both players exhibited
moderately aggressive production behavior during Period I.
During the years from 1975 until 1982, the Nash best response function of the rest of the world experienced a sharp increase in slope.
This reflects a significant increase in the aggressiveness of production
behavior in the rest of the world. A one ton increase in production by
the United States would have caused the rest of the world to increase
its production by 1.69%, which is a 60% increase in slope compared to
Period I. This result is probably due to the fact that most of the producers outside of the United States were not subject to the ban of CFCs
in non-essential uses. The effect may in fact be underestimated, since
Norway, Canada and Sweden banned the use of CFCs in nonessential
uses during this time period.
The years just prior to the Montreal Protocol (1983-1987) are marked
by another sharp increase in aggressiveness by the rest of the world.
The estimate of CF C usa3 indicates that the rest of the world would
increase its production by 1.78 tons, which is almost a two-fold increase
in aggressiveness compared to Period I and an 13% increase compared
to Period II. This result strongly suggests that producers outside of the
United States did change their production behavior in anticipation of
the Montreal Protocol, by displaying extremely aggressive production
behavior. It may have been politically easier for European producers to
increase production of CFCs, since many European governments were
not as supportive of the Protocol as the US, Canada, Norway, Sweden
and Germany (Benedick, 1991).
The parameter estimates on OILt indicate that an increase in the
price of oil will result in decreased production of chlorofluorocarbons.
Even though the parameter on OIL for the rest of the world is not
significant, it carries the correct sign. The parameter on the demand
variable (GDPt ) for the rest of the world is significant and carries the
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Figure 2. Reaction Functions

expected sign. This indicates that CFCs in the rest of the world are a
normal good. The parameter estimate for the US is not significant. 10
To better demonstrate the changes in aggresiveness, figure 2 shows a
graphical representation of both players’ best response functions for the
three different periods. In order to demonstrate the changes and shifts
of these reaction functions that are due to anticipatory production
behavior, GDPt and OILt are held constant at their sample mean.
The continuous time dimension from 1958 until 1987 is now split up
into three distinct time periods.
Figure 2 shows that while the United States’ producers of CFCs
became less and less aggressive as the negotiations for a global treaty
approached, the rest of the world displayed more aggressive production
behavior. This behavior gives strong reason to believe that producers
of CFCs did change their production behavior in anticipation of the
Montreal Protocol.
The interpretation of the production parameters is intriguing and
may allow us to draw conclusions about the pre-treaty behavior of the
10
Mason & Swanson (2001) provide an Environmental Kuznets Curve model of
CFC consumption/emissions across countries and show that an in sample turning
point does exist for some specifications. Since the EKC analysis is conducted in per
capita terms, the sign of the parameter in this paper depends on where individual
countries are with respect to income as well as the level of population since we use
aggregate GDP. We further note that Mason & Swanson (2001) rely on estimated
data from the usage of inputs, which is not available for the years covering Period I.
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USA and the rest of the world. Figure 3 shows the impact of the purely
strategic changes in production behavior from Period I to Period III.
200

Metric Tons of CFC (in thousands)
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−100
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−200
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Net Change
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Figure 3. Impact of strategic behavior on the production of CFCs

The net total increase in emissions due to strategic changes in behavior from Period I to Period III is about 200,000 tons of CFC for the
4 years preceding the Montreal Protocol. The strategic effect is possibly
underestimated, since Canada, Norway and Sweden, who banned CFCs
in non-essential uses during Period II contained local subsidiaries of
producers whose production is captured in the rest of the world data.

5. Conclusions
The intention of this paper was to test for possible anticipatory production behavior by chlorofluorocarbon producing nations prior to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. In
order to test for such behavior we assumed a simple period-by-period
two-player Nash-Cournot game between the United States of America
and the rest of the world. The estimation results presented in Table
II suggest that both players did exhibit a strong, asymmetric and
statistically significant change in behavior during the years just prior
to the Montreal Protocol in 1987.
US producers became less aggressive in the years preceding the Montreal Protocol, while producers in the rest of the world became more
aggressive. The likely explanation for these behavioral changes have to
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do with the enactment of a unilateral control on the production of CFCs
in the United States that followed quickly after the first hint in 1974
that CFCs could destroy atmospheric ozone. Less aggressive behavior
by US producers during 1975 - 1982 apparently resulted from the ban
on non-essential uses of CFCs in the United States. More aggressive
behavior by producers in the rest of the world resulted as they moved
to capture part of the market previously held by US producers. The empirical analysis strongly suggests asymmetric anticipatory production
behavior.
The outcome of this research has important implications for the
future development of policies regulating transboundary pollutants.
If countries do anticipate International Environmental Agreements as
suggested by this research nations who do not display anticipatory
behavior will most likely be required to cutback a larger relative share,
ceteris paribus. Therefore it will make these nations worse off from a
welfare point of view in the long run. The scope of the empirical analysis
in this paper does not allow us to estimate the overall impact of such
behavior on global welfare. We estimate, however, that anticipatory
behavior is responsible for a predicted increase of 200,000 tons of CFCs,
which is roughly 1% of aggregate global CFC production from their
invention until today.
The high level of aggregation of the data set does not allow us to
study the exact nature of strategic behavior. Plant level production
data would allow us to estimate a capacity withholding model, similar
to the models used in the literature on electricity deregulation (e.g.
Harvey & Hogan (2001), Joskow & Kahn (2001)). Our analysis suggests that producers in the United States had an incentive to withhold
production capacity just prior to the Montreal Protocol, whereas producers in the European Union had an incentive to push production past
economically profitable levels - in actuality or on paper. To separate this
effect we would require plant or company level data, which is currently
unavailable to us.
Future negotiations leading to International Environmental Agreements must take into account the incentives inherent in the process of
negotiating treaties specifying cutbacks from a baseline year to avoid
such changes in production behavior.
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